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RouteGuardian: Constructing Secure Routing Paths in
Software-Deﬁned Networking
Mengmeng Wang, Jianwei Liu, Jian Mao , Haosu Cheng, Jie Chen, and Chan Qi
Abstract: Software-Deﬁned Networking (SDN) decouples the control plane and the data plane in network switches
and routers, which enables the rapid innovation and optimization of routing and switching conﬁgurations. However,
traditional routing mechanisms in SDN, based on the Dijkstra shortest path, do not take the capacity of nodes
into account, which may lead to network congestion. Moreover, security resource utilization in SDN is inefﬁcient
and is not addressed by existing routing algorithms. In this paper, we propose RouteGuardian, a reliable securityoriented SDN routing mechanism, which considers the capabilities of SDN switch nodes combined with a Network
Security Virtualization framework. Our scheme employs the distributed network security devices effectively to
ensure analysis of abnormal trafﬁc and malicious node isolation. Furthermore, RouteGuardian supports dynamic
routing reconﬁguration according to the latest network status. We prototyped RouteGuardian and conducted
theoretical analysis and performance evaluation. Our results demonstrate that this approach can effectively use
the existing security devices and mechanisms in SDN.
Key words: Software-Deﬁned Networking (SDN); network security virtualization; capacity-based routing; securityoriented routing; dynamic routing reconﬁguration
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Introduction

Software-Deﬁned Networking (SDN) is a typical
centralized network architecture for managing and
operating networks. It facilitates network management
and eases the burden of solving networking problems
via the logically centralized control offered by a
controller[1–7] . SDN decouples the control layer from
the data layer and provides new ways for the dynamic
control and management of packet forwarding and
processing in switches. In SDN, a centralized controller
deﬁnes network behaviors and conﬁgures network
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devices via a set of policies, which control where
network trafﬁc ﬂows, e.g., whether or when network
trafﬁc should go through a particular security device.
Therefore, the network intelligence in SDN is logically
centralized in the controllers, while the devices in
the infrastructure layer are simple packet-forwarding
devices.
Many security modules, devices, and middleboxes are employed to improve the security of SDN
networks[8–16] . Although these security resources can
provide many security beneﬁts to SDN networks, they
may not be deployed in the physical locations that can
best meet the diverse and increasing security demands
of different users. SDN offers the opportunity to use
security resources in a network ﬂexibly. For example,
Shin et al.[17] presented the concept of Network Security
Virtualization (NSV), which uses SDN technology to
virtualize security functions and resources to network
administrators/users, and thus improve the utilization
of existing security devices. However, NSV does not
consider network capacity when virtualizing security
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resources in the network, which introduces unexpected
network loads. If the load exceeds the network capacity
near a security device, this results in congestion and
denial of service.
In this paper, we propose RouteGuardian, a reliable
security-oriented routing mechanism, which enables the
SDN controller to make full use of security resources
and ensures the reliability of established routing
paths. RouteGuardian provides a weighted shortestpath routing algorithm, in which the weighting is
derived from the network nodes’ capabilities, including
the network and security capabilities. RouteGuardian
supports adaptive routing path reconﬁguration when
the controller perceives practical congestion caused
by attack events or other network accidents in the
established paths.
We prototyped our approach and deployed
RouteGuardian on a POX controller[18] . We extended
the existing Application Layer and POX controller
with RouteGuardian modules. We evaluated the
effectiveness and performance of RouteGuardian and
demonstrated its effectiveness.
Our Contributions. In summary, we make following
contributions in this paper:
 We propose a reliable security-oriented SDN
routing mechanism, RouteGuardian, according to
the capabilities of SDN switch nodes combined
with an NSV framework. Our scheme effectively
employed the distributed network security devices
to ensure analysis of abnormal trafﬁc and malicious
node isolation. Furthermore, RouteGuardian supports
dynamic routing reconﬁguration according to the latest
network status.
 We develop a reliable security-oriented routing
algorithm. The proposed algorithm takes the network
and security capabilities of network switches as inputs,
and makes use of the k-shortest path algorithm to
ensure minimum cost to the network when establishing
a routing path. Our algorithm offers a good balance of
efﬁciency, availability, reliability, and security.

Finally, we implement a prototype of
RouteGuardian, and evaluate its performance. The
results demonstrate that our approach can optimally use
the existing security devices and mechanisms in SDN,
and effectively ensure the abnormal ﬂow isolation with
dynamic routing path reconﬁguration .
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper
is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the
background to our work. Section 3 illustrates the
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proposed reliable security-oriented routing scheme.
Section 4 describes the detailed system design of
RouteGuardian. Section 5 presents the prototype
implementation of RouteGuardian and analyzes the
performance of the system. Section 6 discusses related
work and Section 7 concludes the paper.

2

Background

We present a novel model for constructing secure
routing paths through security entities and nodes with
high capabilities in SDN. This will improve the security
of data delivery in SDN and prevent adversaries from
launching attacks through malicious or non-trusted
node selection.
The method of constructing secure routing paths is
signiﬁcantly different in SDN compared with traditional
networks. As illustrated in Fig. 1a, the security policies
in traditional networks are enforced by physically
forcing trafﬁc to ﬂow through a certain device (e.g.,
an intrusion detection system, or a ﬁrewall). However,
SDN topology is virtual. As illustrated in Fig. 1b, the
logically centralized controller in SDN provides a highlevel view of the whole network to control programs.
This means that the controller has a strong ability to
control network ﬂow and can deploy security policies
generated by corresponding applications to switches.

Fig. 1 Routing path construction in SDN and traditional
networks.
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Therefore, the architecture of SDN makes it more
ﬂexible to control if and when the network trafﬁc goes
through a security device.
For example, in an SDN network, as illustrated in
Fig. 1b, if Host 1, which is controlled by an attacker,
wants to visit Host 4 for a malicious service, Host 1
should ﬁrst send its request to the nearest switch. As
switch 1 is unable to ﬁnd a ﬂow rule/policy to respond to
the request that requires rerouting, it reports this request
to the SDN controller as a Packet-In message. With
centralized control of the SDN controller, the routing
application that communicates with it can build a global
view of the topology of all the switches connected
to the controller. Then, the controller runs a routing
algorithm, based on the current topology information, to
compute a new route from the source to the destination,
and pushes a route update to the involved switches for
future communication between Hosts 1 and 4. Then, if
the green road (Road 2) in Fig. 1b is pushed to these
involved switches, once the compromised Host 1 is
detected by the security device deployed in this road,
Host 1 is immediately isolated. However, if the red road
(Road 1) in Fig. 1b is pushed, as there is no ﬁltering
or security protection in this road, Host 4 would be
attacked.
Routing rules/policies in SDN, which are assigned
by the controller to switches, control where and when
trafﬁc ﬂow goes through a certain device. If the
controller does not consider the network and security
capabilities of the nodes in the SDN network, it cannot
ﬁnd the optimal routing paths that match the reliability
and security requirements of the users.
With increasing security demands, more and more
nodes need to be deployed in the already complicated
SDN networks. Thus, the centralized controller
is required to push more security polices when
constructing routing paths, which makes constructing
secure routing paths in SDN more and more error-prone
and challenging.

3

Reliable
Scheme

Security-Oriented

Routing

In this section, we present our reliable security-oriented
routing scheme. The SDN network topology is shown
in Fig. 2 and consists of three types of entities:
Controller, Hosts, and Switches. Hosts 1, 3, and 4 are
benign hosts and Host 2 is a malicious client. The
nodes S1;    ; S11 are switch nodes. Switch nodes

Fig. 2

Overall topology.

equipped with security resources (e.g., ﬁrewall or IDS)
are called security nodes, e.g., S9 and S10 in Fig. 2,
which are equipped with security devices SD1 and SD2,
respectively.
3.1

Problem deﬁnition

We ﬁrst deﬁne the problem addressed in this paper. The
network is represented as a graph G D .V; E/. V is
a set of nodes, where each node represents a switch in
the SDN network. E is a set of edges, which represents
the connections between the SDN switches. A switch
vi 2 V has several properties that will be discussed in
Section 3.2. With this notion of network, our problem
is formulated as follows.
Given a source node vs , a destination node vd , and a
set of security requirements R D fr1 ; r2 ;    ; rn g, ﬁnd
the max-capacity path from vs to vd that passes nodes
satisfying the requirement set R.
To achieve this, in Section 3.2, we will present
our basic routing algorithm that ensures minimum
network cost and maximum reliability when selecting
the routing path. Taking the security requirements into
account, we will propose our security-oriented routing
path algorithm in Section 3.3.
3.2

3.2.1

Basic algorithm—Network capability based
routing
Network capability

The capability of each node in an SDN network is
attached to its unique identity, which is used in making
routing decisions. We represent the network capability
of a switch node in SDN by a multi-attribute vector,
where each attribute indicates the tendency of the
switch node to conduct a speciﬁc action[19] . The
capability of a switch node vi is deﬁned as a k-
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dimensional vector of Ti , shown as follows:
Ti D

fti.1/ ; ti.2/ ;   

; ti.k/ g

(1)

ti.j /

where
stands for the j -th dimension of the
capability of node vi , j 2 f1; 2;    ; kg, and each
dimension ti.j / 2 Œ0; 1 corresponds to one action
/
Action.j
i .
The network capability of a node is calculated based
on its past behavior and is deﬁned as the probability that
the node will behave the same in the next period. We
consider the following three actions of a network node,
similar to the model proposed by Mahmoud et al.[19]
ti.1/ W The probability of successfully relaying a
packet. Let Nrelay be the number of packets that are
relayed in the last  sessions and Ntotal be the total
number of incoming packets in the last  sessions, then,
ti.1/ depicts the probability that vi will relay a packet
successfully.
Nrelay
(2)
ti.1/ D
Ntotal
ti.2/ W The probability of not breaking a route. Let
Nbroken be the number of sessions broken by vi in the
last  sessions, then, the capability value ti.2/ depicts
the probability that vi will not break a route in the last
 sessions.
Nbroken
(3)
ti.2/ D 1 

ti.3/ W The probability of relaying at least  packets

be the number of sessions that
in a session. Let Nsrelay

vi relayed in at least  packets, then, ti.3/ depicts the
percentage that vi relayed at least  packets in the last 
sessions.

Nsrelay
(4)
ti.3/ D

3.2.2 Reliability of a routing path

To ensure the reliability of a routing path, we take
two types of network capability into account: node
capability and link capability. Link capability is
usually measured from the link’s bandwidth between
two nodes. The bandwidth requirements (speciﬁed by
the users) of the network links should be satisﬁed,
before we evaluate the reliability of the routing path
based on the nodes’ capabilities. As the SDN controller
obtains the status of the network resources periodically,
it can create a reﬁned network topology, in which the
links satisfy the bandwidth requirements. In the rest
of this paper, we take the reﬁned topology as the input
for our algorithm, which means the link bandwidth is
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already satisﬁed, and our algorithms should evaluate
the reliability of the routing path according to node
capabilities only.
Given a routing path p D fv1 ;    ; vn g, the
corresponding reliability attributes of p are depicted as
Tp.j / , which depicts the probability that the j -th action
will be conducted in all nodes on the path p, where
j 2 f1; 2; 3g. Tp.j / can be calculated according to Eq.
.5/.
Y
tv.ji /
(5)
T. p/.j / D
v i 2fv1 ; ;vn g

We aggregate the reliability properties of a routing
path and compute its reliability by following Eq. .6/.
k
X
T. p/.j / !j
(6)
T .p/ D
j D1

where !j is a weight corresponding to the reliability
attributes T. p/.j / , where j 2 f1; 2; 3g. !j reﬂects
the sensitivities of each attribute speciﬁed by users in
the SDN network. Given a speciﬁed sensitivity vector
.˛ .1/ ; ˛ .2/ ; ˛ .3/ /, the weight value !j .j 2 f1; 2; 3g/ is
normalized as
˛ .j /
(7)
!j D 3
P .k/
˛
kD1

We illustrate the detailed process of our Network
Capability based Routing algorithm in Algorithm 1. If
Algorithm 1 Network Capability based Routing Algorithm
Input: start node: vs
destination node: vd
bandwidth requirements: br
Output: the path with the max-capacity from vs to vd
1: BEGIN
2: The SDN controller detects topology of the network based
on the bandwidth requirements
3: Compute a set of possible paths Ppaths D fP1 ;    ; PK g with
the K-shortest path algorithm, which consists K different
paths from vs to vd
4: The SDN controller collects the latest status of all the nodes
in Ppaths
5: for each path PK 2 Ppaths do
Q
.j /
.j /
6:
T .route/P
D
tNode
i
K
T .route/PK
7:

8:

9:

Nodei 2fNode1; ;Noden g
K
P
.j /
D
T .route/P
!
K j
j D1

Select the path with the max-capacity from Ppaths as the
routing path
Prepare the routing path information and distribute them to
the corresponding switches
END
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the bandwidth requirement from a user is not given, the
controller detects the topology of the network without
considering the link bandwidth. Therefore, depending
on these various parameters in real time, nodes with low
capabilities will not have a chance to take part in routes
as they signiﬁcantly degrade route reliability.
Figure 3 shows an example clarifying the process of
using our Network Capability based Routing algorithm.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, there are six possible routing
paths from the source node S1 to the destination node
S7, and the ﬁrst column in Table 1 illustrates the
detailed information on each path. In this example, the
parameter K is set as K D 6, so the K-shortest path
algorithm outputs six routing paths.
Then, the SDN controller collects the latest status of
all the nodes along these six routing paths, as shown
1
in Table 2. Suppose !1 D !2 D !3 D , the third
3
column in Table 1 shows the capability value of each
possible routing path. Therefore, route2 will be output

Fig. 3
Table 1
Case
route1
route2
route3
route4
route5
route6

Table 2
Node
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11

Possible routing paths and nodes status.
Capability of each possible routing path.
Route path
(S1! S2! S3! S7)
(S1! S4! S5! S6! S7)
(S1! S8! S9! S10! S11! S7)
(S1! S2! S5! S6! S7)
(S1! S2! S5! S10! S11! S7)
(S1! S4! S5! S10! S11! S7)

Capability
0.20
0.27
0.26
0.22
0.20
0.24

The latest status of all the nodes in Ppaths .
t .1/
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.9
0.8

t .2/
0.7
0.5
0.6
0.8
0.7
0.9
0.6
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.8

t .3/
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.9
0.9

as the last routing path by the Network Capability based
Routing algorithm, because it is the path with the maxcapacity and a relatively low communication overhead
(it takes 4 hops) from S1 to S7.
3.3

Security-oriented
reconﬁguration

routing

and

dynamic

As different users in SDN usually specify or adjust their
security requirements according to the current network
status, we present the Security-oriented Routing and
Dynamic Reconﬁguration Algorithm based on the
capacity of each network node and the realtime security
requirements of users. As illustrated in Algorithm 2,
this algorithm considers how network packets should
pass through speciﬁc security devices to meet the
security requirements from different users. Meanwhile,
it also considers the various security devices and
functions for routing path construction, and aims to help
the controller choose reasonable security devices based
on the security demands from different users.
Figure 4a is the original network topology, which
contains eleven SDN-enabled switches (denoted as S1–
S11). Among these switches, S1 is the start node, and
S7 is the destination node. Figure 4b shows traditional
packet delivery, which is based on shortest path routing
without considering the capability of nodes or the
Algorithm 2
Security-oriented Routing and Dynamic
Reconﬁguration Algorithm
Input: start node: vs
destination node: vd
bandwidth requirements: br
security requirements: R D fr1 ; r2 ;    ; rn g
Output: the max-capacity path meets R from vs to vd
1: BEGIN
2: The SDN controller detects the security devices in the
network
3: Analyse R and get the set of security devices D D
fsd1 ; sd2 ;    ; sdn g that meets R
4: Find the max-capacity path P .vs ; sd1 / from vs to sd1 with
Algorithm 1
5: for each sd 2 D do
6:
if  > 1
7:
ﬁnd the max-capacity path P.sd1 ;sd / from sd1 to sd
with the Algorithm 1
8: Find the max-capacity path P .sdn ; vd / from sdn to vd with
Algorithm 1
9: The max-capacity path from vs to vd that meets R is:
fP .vs ; sd1 /; P .sd1 ; sd2 /;    ; P .sdn1 ; sdn /; P .sdn ; vd /g
10: Prepare the routing path information and distribute them to
the corresponding security devices and switches
11: END
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Fig. 4 Example scenario for our security-oriented routing
algorithm.

security requirements from users. Thus, packets from
the start node S1 are simply delivered to S7 through the
path (S1! S2! S3 ! S7).
Then, we describe how our new algorithms work
and illustrate them using the same network structure.
Figure 4c shows an example of constructing routing
paths while considering the capability of nodes and
routes in an SDN network. Based on the status
information collected by the SDN controller along
the possible K routing paths, the Network Capability
based Routing Algorithm computes the capability of
each path, and selects the max-capacity path as the
last routing path. Therefore, in this case, all the
packets from S1 to S7 would be forwarded through
the path .S1 ! S4 ! S5 ! S6 ! S7/ by running our
Capability-based Routing Algorithm, as illustrated in
Algorithm 1.
Figure 4d shows our example when the security
requirement from a user is speciﬁed, which demands
that all packets from the start node S1 to the destination
node S7 should be inspected by a security device (e.g.,
an IDS or a ﬁrewall). In this scenario, when the SDN
controller detects the security devices in the network,
it could ﬁnd that switch S10 is attached to a ﬁrewall,
which could meet the security requirement of this user.
Therefore, our Security-oriented Routing Algorithm
would ﬁrst ﬁnd the max-capacity path from S1 to S10
with Algorithm 1, then, ﬁnd the max-capacity path
from S10 to S7. Finally, it outputs .S1 ! S8 ! S9 !
S10 ! S11/ as the last routing path.
Therefore, our Security-oriented Routing Algorithm
will help the SDN controller deliver and redirect the
ﬂow trafﬁc in SDN to different security nodes, and
deploy security entities into reasonable places, thus
providing more secure routing path for users and
improving the security resource utilization in SDN.
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RouteGuardian

In this section, we present the system design
of the security-oriented routing path mechanism,
RouteGuardian, which resides in the SDN controller. In
our system, RouteGuardian timely monitors the status
of network resources in the SDN, thereby perceiving
the network and security capabilities of the network
nodes. RouteGuardian calculates the security-oriented
routing paths based on the transmission and security
requirements speciﬁed by users and the network nodes’
capabilities. Beneﬁting from the network resource
virtualization infrastructure, RouteGuardian ensures
that the established routing path satisﬁes the network
security and reliability requirements effectively. If
there is any abnormal trafﬁc detected by the network
security resources deployed in the selected routing path,
RouteGuardian will react in a timely manner according
to the security policies and dynamically reconﬁgure the
routing paths.
4.1

Overall architecture

As shown in Fig. 5, RouteGuardian extends regular
controllers with four additional modules: (1) Policy
Parser, (2) Resource Status Monitor, (3) Routing Rule
Generator, and (4) Incident Reactor.
Policy Parser. This module is an interface that
mediates a set of high-level security requirements into
the corresponding security policies. For example, if the
security requirement of a user in SDN speciﬁes that all
network packets from Host 1 to port 80 of Host 2 should
be blocked, then the Policy Parser module translates
this security requirement into a corresponding security
policy that the Routing Rule Generator module can
accept when constructing routing paths. As illustrated
in Fig. 5, if SD2 (security device) just has a rule to block

Fig. 5

Conceptual architecture of RouteGuardian.
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network packets from Host 1 to port 80 of Host 2, then
SD2 would be selected as the necessary passing security
device when the Routing Rule Generator constructs the
secure routing paths from Host 1 to Host 2.
Resource Status Monitor.
As the status of
nodes and the bandwidth in SDN is dynamic and
time-sensitive, the Resource Status Monitor module
periodically collects the status of switch nodes,
bandwidth, and security devices in the network, and
stores this information in the Capability Value database.
The information collected by this module is critical
metrics/input data for the Routing Rule Generator
module to construct an optimal routing path that meets
the security requirements of a user.
Routing Rule Generator. The Network Capability
based Routing Algorithm and the Security-oriented
Routing and Dynamic Reconﬁguration Algorithm run
in this module. This module constructs routing paths
based on the latest status of the nodes and the various
security needs of users in SDN. Speciﬁcally, based on
the realtime security requirements of a user in SDN, this
module outputs the max-capacity path from the source
node to the destination node satisfying the security
requirements.
Incident Reactor. This module creates response
strategies corresponding to the security policies, e.g.,
isolating the malicious node/host that creates abnormal
trafﬁc, dropping the malicious packets, etc. Meanwhile,
the Resource Status Monitor module updates the
capability status of the network resource and the SDN
controller reconﬁgures the routing paths according to
the outputs of the Routing Rule Generator module.
4.2

Typical operations of RouteGuardian

In this subsection, we use Fig. 6 to illustrate typical
operations of RouteGuardian.

Fig. 6 Secure routing path establishment and security
response.

Security-oriented routing path construction.
When a user applies for a secure routing path from
its host node Host 1 to a destination node Host 3,
Host 1 should ﬁrst send its request to the nearest
switch S1. Then, S1 sends a routing establishment
request to the controller. The Policy Parser module
creates the corresponding reliability and security
policies according to the capability and security
requirements included in the routing request sent
by Host 1. The Resource Status Monitor module
timely collects the capability status of the network
resources. The Routing Rule Generator module
calculates and outputs routing/ﬂow rules according
to the polices and capability status of the network
resources using the Security-oriented Routing and
Dynamic Reconﬁguration Algorithm. The controller
assigns the secure routing ﬂow rules to the switch
nodes included in the routing path, and establishes
the required route ensuring the security and reliability
requirements simultaneously.
Security Response and Reconﬁguration. Once
there is malicious trafﬁc (such as the red-line shown
in Fig. 6) inspected by a security node (e.g., S9),
the security node will inform the controller. The
Incident Reactor module creates the response strategies
corresponding to the security policies, e.g., isolating
the malicious node/host (e.g., Host 2) that creates
the abnormal trafﬁc, dropping the malicious packets,
etc. Meanwhile, the Resource Status Monitor module
updates the capability status of the network resources
and the controller reconﬁgures the routing paths
according to the output of the Routing Rule Generator
module.

5

Evaluation

We prototyped our approach, RouteGuardian, and its
functionality and performance overhead are evaluated
in this section. We select Mininet[20] , which is popularly
used for emulating OpenFlow network environments,
to emulate our network topologies. We also extended
the POX controller with four additional modules as
illustrated in Fig. 5 to support the main functionality
of RouteGuardian. We set up the experiment on a
3.40 GHz Intel Core(TM) I3-2130 platform with 6 GB
RAM, running 32-bit Ubuntu 12.10 (Kernel version
3.8.0).
We compared RouteGuardian with the shortest path
algorithm from two aspects: .1/ the method of routing
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path construction, and .2/ the performance overhead
introduced by the routing algorithm.
5.1

Routing path comparison

Figure 7 illustrates the network topology used in our
experiment. Our goal is to show the main differences
in the method of routing path construction between
RouteGuardian and the basic shortest path algorithm.
In our experiment, Host 1 requests to send a packet to
port 80 of Host 2, while Host 2 has speciﬁed a security
requirement that all network trafﬁc from Host 1 to port
80 should be audited by a security device. Meanwhile,
Switch 3 (with IP 192.168.1.3) is a malicious node,
which usually breaks a route. The ping test from Switch
2 (with IP 192.168.1.2) in this network is shown in
Fig. 8.
While Host 1 requests to send a packet to port 80
of Host 2, Switch 1 (the nearest switch) reports it to
the controller. In a common SDN controller, as there
are no special modules for security demands, it just

runs the shortest path algorithm (Dijkstra’s algorithm)
based on the topology information, outputs a path
without any security policy, and pushes this routing
path update to the involved switch(es). In this case,
the path .Switch 2 ! Switch 3 ! Switch 5/ will be
selected as the optimal path. However, as Switch 3 (with
IP 192.168.1.3) is a malicious node, it usually captures
the network scenario, rewrites packets, and then breaks
routes by replaying packets with tcpreplay, as shown
in Fig. 9. Therefore, the routing path .Switch 2 !
Switch 3 ! Switch 5/ will not be a secure routing path.
With RouteGuardian deployed on the controller,
things are different. After resolving the network
topology information, RouteGuardian accommodates
the high-level security requirement from Host 2
into the corresponding security policy. As Switch 3
usually breaks a route with low capability, then it
cannot be selected by RouteGuardian for routing path
construction. Finally, RouteGuardian outputs the path
.Switch 2 ! Switch 1 ! Switch 4 ! Switch 5/ as
the optimal path, which meets the security requirement
from Host 2. Meanwhile, RouteGuardian can also give
a security response to these malicious events and isolate
a certain malicious node. The ping test from Switch 2
(with IP 192.168.1.2) is shown in Fig. 10. We can see
that Switch 3 is isolated by RouteGuardian.
5.2

Fig. 7

Routing paths construction comparison.

Fig. 8

Ping test (IP 192.168.1.2).
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Time complexity analysis

For an SDN network G D .V; E/, V is a set of nodes,
E is a set of edges. Let n be the number of nodes in
V , and m be the number of edges in E. Then, for the
shortest path from the source node vs to the destination
node vd , the time complexity of the Dijkstra’s algorithm
using a Fibonacci heap is O.m C n log n/, and the Kshortest path algorithm[21] used in RouteGuardian has a
time complexity of O.K.m C n log n//.
Figure 11 illustrates the overhead between the
shortest path algorithms and the K-shortest path with
different K values. The X -axis corresponds to the
number of nodes in an SDN network, and the Y -axis
corresponds to the time consumed when constructing

Fig. 9

Switch 3 captures, rewrites, and replays packets.
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Table 3
Case
Network 1
Network 2
Network 3
Network 4
Network 5

Fig. 10

Fig. 12

Security response from RouteGuardian.

Network conﬁguration.

Number of nodes
20
30
40
50
100

Number of links
23
34
49
63
127

Topology example for network with 50 nodes.

of our proposed algorithms. Figure 13 illustrates the
time cost of RouteGuardian with different k and
network sizes. Each simulation result is averaged
over 50 samples. The X -axis corresponds to the SDN
network size, and the Y -axis corresponds to the average
time cost for RouteGuardian to compute routing paths
during the processes of routing path construction. The
time cost is also affected by the network topology. We
observe that the performance overhead introduced by
RouteGuardian for routing computation is acceptable.

6
Fig. 11

Time complexity comparison.

the routing paths. Then, when the value of k is small,
RouteGuardian is efﬁcient.
5.3

Impact of network size on the performance of
algorithms

The performance of RouteGuardian changes with the
size of the SDN network. To investigate the impact of
network size on the performance of RouteGuardian, we
consider SDN networks with 20, 30, 40, 50, and 100
nodes. The detailed conﬁguration of each network is
shown in Table 3, and Fig. 12 illustrates an example of
an SDN network with 50 nodes. In Fig. 12, the switch
nodes with color markers, e.g., S9 and S19, are security
nodes equipped with security resources (e.g., ﬁrewall,
IDS, etc.). Meanwhile, the capacity of each node is
uniformly chosen in the range Œ0:01; 1:00.
For each network size, we evaluated the performance

Related Work

The ﬁeld of routing in SDN has been actively
researched. Here we focus on work related to our
central topic, i.e., constructing secure routing paths
in SDN. Two types of prior work are particularly
relevant: routing paths construction in SDN, and secure
routing scheme analysis in traditional networks, which

Fig. 13

Time cost with different network sizes.
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considers the parameters (i.e., bandwidth, trust, node,
and link capability) for routing generation.
6.1

Secure routing path construction in SDN

Recently, several studies have been proposed to address
the SDN routing construction issue. To maximize
the security resource utilization in SDN, Shin et
al.[17] presented the concept of NSV and four basic
routing algorithms, which virtualize security resources
and provide security response functions from network
devices when necessary. However, current routing
algorithms in NSV do not consider the capability of
each network node when routing network packets.
Huang et al.[22] proposed a novel cost model, which
simulates the usage costs of nodes and link resource,
to maximize the network throughput under both
critical network resources and user bandwidth demand
constraints. Shen et al.[23] proposed a new reliable
multicast tree for reliable multicast routing in SDN
to minimize both tree and recovery costs. However,
solutions[22, 23] consider many more multicast routing
problems and costs in SDNs. Compared with them, we
focus more on the security of routing.
Lee and Sheu[24] proposed a routing algorithm for
SDN with segment routing, which considers the balance
of trafﬁc load and reduces the extra cost of packet
header size in a network. Agarwal et al.[25] considered
the problem of trafﬁc engineering in the case where
an SDN controller controls only a few forwarding
elements, and tried to optimize the network utilization
and decrease the packet drop rate. To balance the
usage of link bandwidth and ﬂow table when routing
in SDN, Lee et al.[26] proposed a novel resource
preference aware routing algorithm. Meanwhile, Li
et al.[6] focused on the problem of routing under
middlebox sequence constraints and designed a fast
recovery mechanism by exploiting the remaining link
and middlebox resources locally. Huang et al.[27] and
Wan et al.[28] also developed an evaluation system that
considered routing engineering in SDN.
In addition, Yoon et al.[29] explored the attack
surface of SDN by actually attacking each layer in
an SDN stack. Park et al.[30] considered how to
enrich security functions/features in software-deﬁned
environments and proposed a new software switch
architecture, which enables software switches to easily
provide security services without additional security
devices or applications.
Compared with these previous works, the primary
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focus of our work is security and network capabilitybased routing path construction. We take the network
capability of these security devices and switches as a
unique concern.
6.2

Secure routing path construction in traditional
networks

Previous work on secure routing in traditional networks
has extensively discussed trust, vulnerability, and
reliability issues. These techniques are complementary
to our design of RouteGuardian.
Mahmoud et al.[19] presented a trust-based routing
protocol that directs network trafﬁc to those highlytrusted nodes having sufﬁcient energy, to minimize
the probability of breaking a route. Johnson et al.[31]
considered the various security concerns for route
selection in anonymity networks. Chen et al.[32]
proposed a dynamic trust model to optimize the secure
routing protocol in DTN environments. Kang and
Gligor[33] introduced the notion of routing bottlenecks,
and presented their key characteristics, including size,
link type, and distance from host destinations. Chen et
al.[34] used symmetric cryptography for data forwarding
and presented a highly-scalable anonymity system that
leverages next-generation Internet architecture design.
Meanwhile, some schemes regarding mobilityaware routing and multicast routing[35–38] can also be
combined with our dynamic routing path construction.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we propose RouteGuardian, a new
mechanism based on NSV, which dynamically
establishes reliable secure-oriented routing paths
in SDN, and aggregates switch node capabilities.
RouteGuardian takes the nodes’ network and
security capabilities as critical metrics, thus ensuring
the establishment of a reliable routing path and
enforcing malicious trafﬁc detection, isolation, and
dynamic routing reconﬁguration. We prototyped our
approach and the experiment results demonstrate that
RouteGuardian supports robust secure routing path
establishment and effectively utilizes the existing
security devices distributed in SDN. We will improve
the performance of RouteGuardian in our future work,
and aim to deploy it to distributed controllers to
improve control plane scalability.
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